We will soon have nationally normed data. Please come back for those.
In the meantime, you can see a number of published papers concerning philosophical character.
For a general overview of philosophical character, see:
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E.T. (2013). Predicting philosophical disagreement. Philosophy Compass, 8/10, 978-989.
For some theoretical implications of philosophical character, see
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E.T. (2012). The Philosophical Personality Argument. Philosophical Studies, 161, 227-246.
For free will character facets, see:
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E.T. (2009). Do Judgments about Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions about Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 342-350.
Cokely, E. T., & Feltz, A. (2010). Questioning the free will comprehension question. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2440-2445). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Feltz, A., Perez, A., & Harris, M. (2012). Free will, causes, and decisions: Individual differences in written reports. The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19, 166-189.
Feltz, A. (2013). Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will. Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 54-63.
Feltz, A., & Millan, M. (in press). An error theory for compatibilist intuitions. Philosophical Psychology.
In Verified Experts
Schulz, E., Cokely, E.T., & Feltz, A. (2011). Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense. Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 1722-1731.
For Ethics facets, see
Feltz. A., & Cokely, E.T. (2013). Virtue or consequences: The folk against Pure Evaluational Internalism. Philosophical Psychology, 26, 702-717.
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E.T. (2012). The virtues of ignorance. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3, 335-350.
Cokely, E.T., & Feltz, A. (2011). Virtue in business: Morally better, praiseworthy, trustworthy, and more satisfying. Journal of Organizational Moral Psychology, 2, 13-26.
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E. T. (2008). The fragmented folk: More evidence of stable individual differences in moral judgments and folk intuitions. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (Eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1771-1776). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
For Intentional Action facets
Feltz, A., Harris, M., & Perez, A. (2012). Perspective in intentional action attribution. Philosophical Psychology, 25, 673-687.
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E.T. (2011). Individual Differences in Theory-of-Mind Judgments: Order Effects and Side Effects. Philosophical Psychology, 24, 343-355.
Cokely, E.T., & Feltz, A. (2009). Individual differences, judgment biases, and Theory-of-Mind: Deconstructing the intentional action side effect asymmetry. Journal of Research in Personality, 43, 18-24.